Bridge strike leads to PI

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A number of mitigating factors meant that moderate action was deemed appropriate following a bridge strike by a double-deck bus whilst engaged in private hire work

Atlantic Travel (GB) Limited is the holder of a standard international public service vehicle operator’s licence (PC1078893) which was issued in 2009. Thirty-seven vehicles are authorised. Sole director is Yasser Ahmed Dean, who is also Transport Manager (TM) along with David Roy Horrocks.

The operator and its Transport Managers were called to public inquiry after it notified, in accordance with the regulations, the Office of the Traffic Commissioner that one of its vehicles had collided with a railway bridge on 27 May 2022. The information provided within the notification raised concerns about the adequacy of the operator’s measures to reduce the risk of bridge strikes, prompting the call to public inquiry. The inquiry was heard by Traffic Commissioner (TC) for the North West of England Gerallt Evans.

History

The operator had been called to public inquiry (PI) on three earlier occasions; at the time of application for an operator’s licence in 2009, and in 2017 and 2021. These inquires related to maintenance standards and resulted in the issue of warnings and recording of undertakings. In this instance, the Traffic Commissioner said he was satisfied that there were no wider compliance issues that required consideration at the public inquiry other than the bridge strike.

A call to public inquiry was issued in August, alongside Transport Managers Dean and Horrocks, at which the steps the operator and transport managers took to assess the risks and ensure that routes were planned in advance, to ensure that drivers, transport managers and planners were properly trained to enable them to assess the risks, and to ensure that drivers were be provided with adequate information including about the vehicles which they are driving would be considered.

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The hearing was held at Golborne on 1 November 2022. The operator was represented by director and Transport Manager Mr Dean and Transport Manager Mr Horrocks. Transport Consultant Grahame Robinson was also present, legal representation was provided by Mark Davies of Backhouse Jones. A conjoined driver conduct hearing was held for the driver involved in the bridge strike, Hassan Akhtar, whose vocational entitlement was revoked. He was disqualified from holding a PSV driving licence for six months.

Findings

The basic facts of the bridge strike were largely not disputed: the operator was transporting around 55 children and five staff from a primary school in Prestwich, Manchester for a visit to the Quarry Bank Mill heritage site. Mr Akhtar was driving a double-deck bus and had been given a job sheet the previous day which set out the origin and destination points but did not give any route details. He planned the route himself using Google Maps on a computer in the office; it was said that a supervisor would have been present to help with route planning but on this occasion he had not sought assistance. It was believed that assistance had been offered, but the evidence from all the witnesses was said to be unclear on this point.

Having completed the outward journey without incident, Mr Akhtar said he followed the route from memory but also had access to Google Maps on his mobile phone that was held in a cradle. On the return journey he encountered congestion and became concerned that he would be delayed returning to the school, and that he would be late for his scheduled school run duties later that afternoon. He said he had not contacted his office to discuss this concern, though Mr Dean’s understanding differed; he believed that Mr Akhtar had rung the office and been reassured that another driver could cover the school run.

Regardless of which version of events was correct, TC Evans said he was satisfied the operator did not place Mr Akhtar under undue pressure to compete his journey and that was not a cause of the collision. However, as a result of the congestion, Mr Akhtar had decided to follow a different route back to the school, which was suggested to him by Google maps. He conceded that Google maps was not set up to consider the size of his vehicle when planning a route.

Mr Akhtar turned onto Fairfax Road, Prestwich, which has a railway bridge. He had not driven on that road before, but photographs showed a warning sign at the side of the road about the bridge and its height, which was clearly marked with a sign confirming its height as 13’ 9”. The double decker vehicle had a height of 14’ 6”, indicated by a marker visible in the cab. Mr Akhtar said the Google maps route did not flag the bridge and claimed not to have seen the signs, but the TC said there was no reasonable explanation why he should not have seen any of the signs.

He then proceeded to drive slowly under the bridge, though his his speed appeared to be a result of the heavy traffic rather than a conscious decision to pass carefully. The roof came into contact with the underside of the bridge; scrape marks on the roof were consistent with it having come into contact with bolts protruding from the underside of the bridge.

Mr Akhtar said he stopped and asked his passengers to disembark whilst he reversed the bus out, and reported the matter to his office before continuing the journey without further incident.

Transport Manager Mr Horrocks went to the bridge and could not see any damage. He saw the sign with details of how to notify any collision to the bridge operator, he decided not to do so as he could not see any damage to it. The TC found this troubling as Mr Dean said during the hearing that they were not experts on bridge structures. Following an internal investigation Mr Akhtar was issued with a written warning which stated that he had neglected to research and plan his journey putting himself, his passengers, his vehicle and third-party property at serious risk of injury and property damage. Mr Akhtar and other drivers were trained in bridge strike avoidance in the wake of the incident, and he remained employed by the operator.

Gross error

The TC found the collision to have been the result of a gross error of judgment by Driver Akhtar and that robust driver conduct action was required to ensure his future fitness to drive, but said that did not exonerate the operator. Nonetheless, the TC said he was satisfied that the Transport Managers had taken some steps to address the risk of bridge strikes before the incident in May 2022.

Most of the operator’s work involves daily school services, and drivers are taken out to learn the route. A similar approach is taken to the operator’s rail replacement work. Private hire work, such as that which Driver Akhtar was undertaking when the bridge strike occurred, is a smaller proportion of the operator’s work and mostly undertaken by coaches that are fitted with commercial sat-nav devices. The company said it was unusual for a double-deck bus to be used for a one-off private hire booking and that it was practice for drivers to plan their own route having been given details of the starting point and destination. Access to Google maps was available, along with support from Transport Manager Horrocks or one of the other supervisors, though the impression was that such assistance was rarely sought by the drivers.

In relation to the specific journey, the TC found that Mr Akhtar was effectively left to his own devices, and that when he encountered the congestion, he felt at liberty to choose his own alternative route without having to consult with his office. The company’s own Driver Operational Manual contains an instruction that sat-nav systems should be in commercial vehicle format and prohibits car sat-nav systems. It also states that mobile phones are only to be used in hands-free mode and for emergency use only. Mr Akhtar was in breach of that instruction when he used Google maps on his phone, and Mr Horrocks conceded that the operator had not undertaken any ongoing monitoring to ensure drivers were complying.

Risk assessments

The TC gave credit to the operator that it did undertake an annual risk assessment that included consideration of bridge strikes, a practice implemented by Mr Horrocks on his appointment and in the light of the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s guidance.

Since the incident the company has increased the frequency of the risk assessment to every six months. Risk assessments undertaken by the Transport Managers in March and September 2022 rated the risk of a bridge strike as ‘High’ with further action needed in the form of more training and a better route planning system. Reference was also made to information posted on a noticeboard about the location of low bridges and other hazards and to drivers being encouraged to ask for assistance. However, the Transport Managers were unable to provide any specific evidence of tangible changes made between the risk assessment in March 2022 and the incident on 27 May 2022. Changes were made in the wake of the incident, but the TC concluded that the operator did not act promptly and effectively to implement the changes it had identified as being necessary earlier in the year.

Positive changes.

TC Evans gave credit that the changes that happened since the incident were mostly positive. The operator put all drivers through a two-hour long course on bridge strike avoidance in June 2022 and reissued its guidance on the use of sat-nav devices. An audit was undertaken the same month to identify what sat-nav devices each driver was using and to check they were compliant with company policy. However, the TC said he remained remain concerned that the operator had not implemented a policy of checks to ensure drivers were actually complying with those instructions.

The operator has recruited an additional supervisor to assist with route planning and has invested in software to show suitable routes, a copy of which can be printed and attached to the driver’s job sheet. Drivers have also been given access to an app on their mobile phones that they can access in the event of encountering a diversion from their given route.

Summarising his findings, TC Evans said: “This is not a case where the operator and its Transport Managers had completely failed to consider the risk of bridge strikes. There was an annual risk assessment process in place and route planning was carried out for the largest part of the operator’s work on regular school runs and rail replacement services. The risk in relation to private hire work was mitigated to an extent by the fitting of commercial sat-nav devices to the operator’s coaches. Efforts had also been made to dissuade drivers from using their own unsuitable devices.

“I find that there was a gap in that approach, and it was exposed by this incident. Insufficient steps had been taken to reduce the risk of a bridge strike involving a double decker bus being used on private hire work. I find the operator (and in particular Mr Dean and Mr Horrocks as Transport Managers) failed to take sufficient steps to ensure that the drivers planned suitable routes for such journeys.” He concluded that there had been a complacency in the company’s approach and concluded that while primary responsibility for the bridge strike must rest with the driver, there were contributory failings on the part of the operator and its Transport Managers which gave grounds for regulatory action.

Considerations

In the company’s favour, the TC said that he saw no wider compliance issues that merit regulatory action; the operator’s compliance was generally good and continually improving, especially since the appointment of Mr Horrocks.

Having considered the evidence before him, along with the Upper Tribunal’s remarks in the 2019 case of Bridgestep Limited, where the presiding TC stated that “it is incumbent upon the transport manager and the company to ensure that the company’s vehicles are operated without risk to road safety and in particular, that the risk of bridge strikes, which could have catastrophic consequences, should be assessed and routes planned in advance to eliminate that risk,” TC Evans determined that the operator and its two Transport Managers did not fully satisfy that duty and that there was ineffective management control and insufficient procedures in place to prevent operator licence compliance failings.

He balanced this with the fact that there was not a complete absence of such control and procedures and limited his criticism to the cases of use of double-deck vehicles for private hire work. As a result of the numerous positive factors, TC Evans concluded that regulatory action falling into the ‘moderate to low’ category was appropriate. He concluded that he could have confidence that the operator can be trusted to be compliant in future and that a suspension of the entire operation would be disproportionate.

The TC’s decision was therefore to place a condition on the licence limiting the number of PSVs for a short but meaningful period of 14 days. A reduction of five vehicles, which corresponds with the number used for private hire work and should not affect the operator’s ability to service its school transport and rail replacement commitments, was deemed appropriate. A period of 28 days’ notice was given, with 14 days for the operator to make further representations. A warning was deemed sufficient for Transport Managers Dean and Horrocks, with no loss of repute.

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